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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the risk of a bank's insolvency was borne primarily by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").' However, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 19932 includes the National
Depositor Preference provision3 which, for the first time, places both
I.
A federal regulatory authority that began operating in 1934 and that supervises
insured state banks and provides insurance protection to both commercial banks
and thrifts for deposits of up to $100,000 in separate insured funds: the Savings
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) for savings associations and the Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF) for banks.
ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING,
INSURANCE, AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 395-96 (1994). "The FDIC was created in 1933
in response to the Great Depression to 'preserve solvency of insured banks and thus to keep
open the channels of trade and commercial exchange."' Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm.
of First Republicbank Corp. v. FDIC, 749 F. Supp. 758, 767 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (quoting Weir
v. United States, 92 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 761 (1937)).
2. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 is "[a]n act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to section 7 of the concurrent
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1994." Id.
3. Id. § 3001, 107 Stat. at 336 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(I 1) (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
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insured4 and uninsured5 depositors of FDIC insured depository institutions6
("banks")7 ahead of unsecured (general) creditors' in a bank liquidation. 9
Prior to the passing of this legislation, depositors and unsecured
creditors shared a bank's liquidated assets on a pro rata basis, except for
those banks located in one of the twenty-nine states that already had
depositor preference laws which applied only to thrifts and state-chartered
banks.'0 The National Depositor Preference provision applies to all banks,
and state laws governing the distribution of a failed bank's assets will be
preempted if they are inconsistent with the new federal law." The risk of
a bank's insolvency is now borne by the unsecured creditors, rather than
depositors of the bank.
"Though it was sold merely as an alternative to levying federal
examination fees on state-chartered institutions, depositor preference . . .
will have many far-reaching and numerous unintended consequences.""
This provision effectively relieves the burden carried by both the FDIC and
taxpayers when a bank fails.
4. "Subject to paragraph (2), the term 'insured deposit' means the net amount due to any
depositor for deposits in an insured depository institution . 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. "The term 'uninsured deposit' means the amount of any deposit of any depositor at
any insured depository institution in excess of the amount of the insured deposits of such
depositor (if any) at such depository institution." Id. § 1813(m)(3). Depositors with accounts
containing more than $100,000 risk losing part of their principal and interest earned if the
bank holding their account becomes insolvent and its assets are liquidated.
6. "The term 'insured depository institution' means any bank or savings association the
deposits of which are insured by the Corporation pursuant to this Act." Id. § 1813(c)(2).
7. "The term 'bank' . . . means any national bank, State bank, and District bank, and
any Federal branch and insured branch;
(B) includes any former savings association that-
(i) has converted from a savings association charter; and
(ii) is a Savings Association Insurance Fund member."
Id. § 1813(a)(1).
8. An general creditor is "[a] creditor at large ... or one who has no lien or security
for the payment of his debt or claim." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 368 (6th ed. 1990). A
creditor at large is "[o]ne who has not established his debt by the recovery of a judgment or
has not otherwise secured a lien on any of the debtor's property." Id.
9. Liquidation is the "process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and
dividing surplus or loss" among the banks' creditors. Id. at 931.
10. H.R. REP. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
11. Id.
12. Bert Ely, Surprise! Congress Just Enacted the Core Banking System, AMERICAN
BANKER, Sept. 21, 1993, at 24.
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Before the National Depositor Preference provision was enacted, the
FDIC paid insured depositors up to $100,000 a per lost deposit, 4 and
attempted to recoup the depositor insurance payout through either liquidation
of the failed bank's assets or by allowing the failed institution to be acquired
by another bank. 5 Both secured and unsecured creditors of the bank were
reimbursed from the liquidated assets of the bank before the FDIC was fully
reimbursed, causing the FDIC to suffer great losses. As a result, the FDIC
deposit insurance fund 6 was depleted and taxpayers were forced to pick
up the tab.
With this in mind, part two of this article will discuss the recent history
of bank failures in the United States, providing the reader with a better
understanding of the impossible task that both the FDIC and Congress face
in attempting to protect taxpayers as well as the integrity of the banking
system. In part three, this article will provide an overview of the historical
development of depositor preference. Part four will define national
depositor preference and explain why it was included as part of the budget
bill. Part five will analyze the possible effect depositor preference will have
on unsecured creditors. In part six, the potential effect on the banking
13. "The net amount due to any depositor at an insured depository institution shall not
exceed $100,000. ... 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. The term "deposit" means:
the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a bank or
savings association in the usual course of business and for which it has given or
is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or unconditionally, to a commer-
cial, checking, savings, time, or thrift account, or which is evidenced by its
certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment certificate, certificate of
indebtness, or other similar name, or a check or draft drawn against a deposit
account and certified by the bank or savings association, or a letter of credit or
a traveler's check on which the bank or savings association is primarily liable
Id. § 1813(0(1).
15. When one bank acquires another, the two banks enter into a purchase and
assumption agreement. Through a purchase and assumption transaction, all deposits and other
liabilities of general creditors are assumed by a new or existing bank. Downriver Community
Fed. Credit Union v. Penn Square Bank, 879 F.2d 754, 764 n.8 (10th Cir. 1989). Therefore,
despite a bank failure, all depositors and other unsecured creditors are made whole instead
of simply receiving a pro rata share of the liquidated assets. Id. "[Since] 1960 about three-
fourths of all failed commercial banks and, until Penn Square Bank, all failures over $100
million in size [had] been handled through purchase and assumption transactions (P & As)."
Id. (citing FDIC, DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 6 (1983)).
16. The bank insurance fund is the "Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
unit providing deposit insurance for banks other than thrifts." DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 31 (3d ed. 1991).
1995] 1123
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industry will be discussed. Finally, this article will conclude that the
National Depositor Preference provision is not the solution to the bank
failure problem because it only treats a symptom, rather than the cause of
the problem. A national depositor preference scheme, while saving the
FDIC money in the short run, will do more harm than good, especially to
smaller banks and small businesses, because of the attempt by unsecured
creditors to protect themselves from the possibility of losing everything if
their bank fails.
II. THE TROUBLED BANKING SYSTEM AND THE FDIC
Traditional banking functions consist of accepting deposits, offering
checking privileges, and making loans. 7 Until recently, banks were able
to make a profit by concentrating strictly on traditional banking services
because federal regulation gave them a monopoly" in those services.
However, this monopoly situation no longer exists because other financial
institutions 9 have entered traditional banking markets. Savings are now
placed into a variety of investments other than bank accounts, such as
corporate,2" federal and municipal2' bonds, purchase money mortgages,22
and other investments that offer a greater return than deposit accounts at
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
18. A monopoly is "control of the production and distribution of a product or service
by one firm .... " DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMs 259 (3d ed. 1991).
19. A financial institution is "[a]n institution that uses its funds chiefly to purchase
financial assets as opposed to tangible property. . . . Nondeposit intermediaries include,
among others, insurance companies, pension companies, and financial companies. Depository
intermediaries include commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, and
credit unions." GART, supra note 1, at 396.
20. A corporate bond is a:
debt instrument issued by a private corporation ... [that] typically [has] four
distinguishing features: 1) [it is] taxable; 2) [it has] a par value of $1000; 3) [it
has] a term maturity-which means they come due all at once-and are paid for
out of a sinking fund accumulated for that purpose: 4) [it is] traded on major
exchanges, with prices published in newspapers.
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMs 87 (3d ed. 1991).
21. A municipal bond is a "debt obligation of a state or local government entity." Id.
at 264.
22. A purchase money mortgage is a "[mortgage] given by a buyer in lieu of cash for
the purchase of property." Id. at 345.
Vol. 191124
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banks.23 Additionally, money market funds24 offer checking privileges.25
Finally, loans are being made by a diversity of nonbank firms.26 The
bank's role as a financial intermediary, providing transaction services to
customers, and making a profit doing so, has been diminished because of
strong competition and advances in technology. 2 Heavy regulation of the
banking industry, while attempting to diminish the risk of bank failure, is
actually restricting the banking industry's ability to compete with nonbank
institutions. Subsequently, heavy regulation may actually have the adverse
effect of increasing the risk of bank failure.
Bank failures are attributable to many of the same causes which result
in the failure of other businesses.28 If a business becomes inefficient or
obsolete, it will no longer profit, and over time, it will fail. 29 "An obsolete
firm fails because consumer demand is too low to generate a price that is
.. high [enough] to cover the firm's ... costs... "30 Nonbank financial
institutions are offering not only the same services as banks, but also a wide
variety of other services that attract depositors and borrowers away from
banks. Therefore, to a great degree, banks are becoming obsolete.3'
23. JONATHON R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION
37 (1992).
24. A money market fund is a mutual fund "that invests in commercial paper, banker's
acceptances, repurchase agreements, government securities, certificates of deposit and other
highly liquid and safe securities, and pays money market rates of interest .... Such funds
usually offer the convenience of checkwriting privileges." DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 258 (3d ed. 1991).
25. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 23, at 37.
26. Id. For example, insurance companies, mortgage companies, pension funds, and
consumer finance firms. Id.
27. Id. Technology has eroded the banks' traditional informational edge that they once
had over other financial institutions. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure:
The Politicization of a Social Problem, 45 STAN. L. REV. 289, 294 (1992). One of the
reasons that banks profited was because they had a distinct informational advantage that
enabled them to make highly informed credit decisions. Id. Technology has given everyone
access to this same information. Id.
28. Id. at 290. The article is a summary and analysis of several recent books on the
failure of bank regulation. Included are: JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN BANKING (1992); LOWELL L. BRYAN, BANKRUPT: RESTORING THE HEALTH AND
PROFITABILITY OF OUR BANKING SYSTEM (1991); HELEN A. GARTEN, WHY BANK
REGULATION FAILED: DESIGNING A BANK REGULATORY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S (1991);
JAMES L. PIERCE, THE FUTURE OF BANKING (1991).
29. Id.
30. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 290.
31. Id.
1995] 1125
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Banks and banking regulatory agencies facilitated their own destruction
by creating the monopoly banks enjoyed for so many years.32 When any
industry enjoys abnormally high profits, new entrants will be attracted to it
until it is no longer profitable to enter the market. When too many
companies enter a market, supply becomes greater than demand and only the
most cost-efficient firms that offer the most attractive products survive.
In the banking industry, the new entrants that compete directly with
banks are financial institutions like insurance companies, investment
banks,33 pension funds,34 and credit unions35 which, unlike their bank
counterparts, do not have to comply with costly regulations, such as those
that restrict the banks' activities.36 Although banks no longer enjoy a
monopoly in their market, they continue to be regulated as though they were
a monopoly.37 This has the effect of burdening the banking industry with
all of the costs associated with heavy regulation while simultaneously
prohibiting banks from competing in many profitable ventures.38 Thus,
rising costs and lower profits have led to increased bank failures over the
last several years.
In an effort to make up lost profits resulting from the changing
environment of the financial services industry, banks have increasingly
invested in riskier assets. "If there is any reason the insured might prefer
that an insured loss occur, or be inclined to be less careful to avoid the loss,
there is said to be a moral hazard."39 The protection of depositor funds
by the FDIC has created a moral hazard that causes banks to take greater
chances. If the risks pay off, the shareholders gain a great deal, and if the
risks fail, the shareholders only lose up to their initial investment.4" In
32. Id. Politicians created the banking cartel because of their need and desire to have
banks at their disposal. Id. It was a very cozy arrangement.
33. An investment banker is a "firm, acting as underwriter or agent, that serves as
intermediary between an issuer of securities and the investing public." DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 210 (3d ed. 1991).
34. A pension fund is a "fund set up by a corporation, labor union, governmental entity,
or other organization to pay the pension benefits of retired workers." Id. at 315.
35. A credit union is a"not-for-profit financial institution typically formed by employees
of a company, a labor union, or a religious group and operated as a cooperative. Credit
unions may offer a full range of financial services and pay higher rates on deposits and
charge lower rates on loans than commercial banks." Id. at 93.
36. Id.
37. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 291.
38. Id.
39. SPENCER L. KIMBALL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 134 (1992).
40. MACEY & MILLER, supra note 23, at 37.
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contrast, the FDIC has everything to lose and nothing to gain. Additionally,
deposit insurance keeps banks viable because it enables them to attract the
funds necessary for these risky investments at below market rates. Without
insurance, a bank would be forced to increase the interest rate earned by
depositors in order to compensate for the increased danger associated with
these riskier investments. Not only are banks investing in riskier assets, but
unlike nonbank financial institutions, whose assets are balanced by equity
debt, a bank's assets (largely illiquid) are balanced against demand debts
(highly liquid).4 Thus, if there is a run on a bank,42 due to a rumor of
bad investments or a bank panic,43 the bank will be unable to liquidate its
assets to pay off its liabilities. Consequently, another bank will fail.
When a bank fails, the FDIC becomes the receiver of the failed
institution and can either liquidate the bank's assets or allow another bank
to enter into a purchase and assumption agreement with the failed bank.44
If the first option is chosen, the failed bank is dissolved by the FDIC in an
attempt to pay off the creditors of the bank.45 If the assets are insufficient
to satisfy the claims of creditors, insured depositors will receive up to
$100,000 per deposit, and uninsured depositors will receive a pro rata
distribution of the remaining assets. After these payments are made, the
unsecured creditors will be paid, if money is left.46 Before the creation of
depositor preference, unsecured creditors and depositors would receive
payment, if any, from the bank's liquidated assets on a pro rata basis.
The overprotective treatment of banks by the FDIC has made the
$100,000 insurance coverage limit for insured deposits relatively unimpor-
tant.47 "In 861 of the 1086 bank failures during the 1980s, the FDIC either
found another bank to take over the operations of the failed bank through
a P&A or provided financial assistance to give the bank time to recover or
41. Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 296.
42. A run on a bank is a "[s]ituation in which a large number of depositors of a bank
lose confidence in the safety of their deposits and attempt to withdraw their funds from the
bank." GART, supra note 1, at 400. "A bank failure resulting from a bank run occurs when
illiquid bank assets are sold at a loss to meet depositors' requests for funds." Rowena A.
Pecchenino, Risk-Based Deposit Insurance: An Incentive Compatible Plan, 24 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 499, 501 (1992).
43. A bank panic is "[tlhe simultaneous failure of many banks." GART, supra note 1,
at 391.
44. Id. at 158.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
1995] 1127
7
Ratway: National Depositor Preference: In an Attempt to Raise Revenue, Co
Published by NSUWorks, 1995
Nova Law Review
arrange a merger."'  The result, in these instances, is that neither unin-
sured depositors or unsecured creditors lost any money.49 "In the remain-
ing 225 failures, insured deposits were transferred to another bank or were
paid off up to the $100,000 limit of coverage."5  Most of these banks
were smaller institutions. Thus, uninsured depositors, unsecured creditors,
and the FDIC suffered losses.'
Losses suffered by uninsured depositors and unsecured creditors, when
a small bank fails, create a shift of funds to larger banks. 2 Large banks
are protected by the "too big to fail" doctrine, thus effectively making
deposit insurance obsolete. 3 The underlying rationale behind the "too big
to fail" doctrine is that by allowing a large bank to fail, problems would be
created throughout the entire banking industry. 4 Therefore, all of the
deposits at the largest banks are fully protected because if a large bank were
headed toward insolvency, the FDIC would intervene. Smaller banks,
however, are not protected in such a manner.
In November 1990, Freedom National Bank, a relatively small,
minority-owned, Harlem-based bank became insolvent as a result of
numerous speculative loans that went bad. The FDIC decided to close
and liquidate the bank... because the failure of the bank would not
have any serious repercussions on the rest of the banking system. Large
customers received about 50 cents on the dollar for deposits in excess
of $100,000. Charitable organizations, such as the National Urban
League and the Negro College Fund, and several churches suffered
losses. William Seidman, then FDIC chairman, testified before
Congress that "My first testimony when I came to this job was that it's
unfair to treat big banks in a way that covers all depositors but not
small banks. I promised to do my best to change that. Five years later,
I can report that my best wasn't good enough." It is interesting to note
that legislation was passed by Congress in late 1991 to eliminate "too
big to fail" operations by the FDIC beginning in 1994.56
48. GART, supra note 1, at 158.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 154-55.
53. GART, supra note I, at 159.
54. Id. at 155.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 156-57.
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In its attempt to make a profit, the bank may not be as concerned with
the risks it takes since the FDIC bears all of the risks of any bad invest-
ments. If deposit insurance is to remain in place, insured banks must be
forced back to their "traditional" role of accepting deposits and making
loans.
The goal of regulation is to force banks to protect the deposits of
individuals by requiring them to accumulate low-risk, marketable assets.
If this goal were accomplished, insured deposits and creations like the
National Depositor Preference provision would not be necessary to protect
deposits or to maintain people's confidence in the banking industry.
III. THE ROAD TO DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE
Throughout the modem era of banking in the United States, "[o]ne of
the objects of the national bank system [has been] to secure, in the event of
insolvency, a just and equal distribution of the assets of national banks58
among unsecured creditors, and to prevent such banks from creating
preferences in contemplation of their failure."'59 The National Bank
Act's6" policy in a bank liquidation is to achieve "equity of equality among
creditors."'" The rule against preferences was codified in the National
Bank Act at 12 U.S.C. §§ 91, 194.62
57. John A. Deangelis, Riches Do Not Last Forever: Real Estate Investment by National
Banks, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 785 (1991).
58. A national bank is a:
commercial bank whose charter is approved by the U.S. Comptroller of the
Currency rather than by a state banking department. National banks are required
to be members of the FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM and to purchase stock in the
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK in their district .... They must also belong to the
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION.
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 269-70 (3d ed. 1991).
59. Mechanics Universal Joint Co. v. Culhane, 299 U.S. 51, 55 (1936).
60. "[The] National Banking Act of 1864 [c]reated Comptroller of Currency, which
provided for the granting of federal banking charters and examination and supervision of
national banks." GART, supra note 1, at 387.
61. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 511 (1892).
62. 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 91, 194 (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1994); Mcorp & Mcorp Fin.,
Inc. v. Clarke, 755 F. Supp. 1402, 1407 n. I1 (N.D. Tex. 1991). If greater distributions are
made to some creditors over others, and there are insufficient assets in the receivership to
provide full payment to the intrabank creditors, the agreements are void as fraudulent
transfers under 12 U.S.C. § 191, and violate the ratable distribution requirements of 12
U.S.C. § 194. Senior Unsecured Creditors' Comm., 749 F. Supp. at 774.
Section 91 prohibits the transfer of assets after the commission of an act of
insolvency made "with a view to the preference of one creditor to another."
1995] 1129
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Historically, the courts have rejected the notion of depositor prefer-
ence.63 The courts have interpreted the National Bank Act as not permit-
ting depositor preference. It is only in the past several years that both state
and national banks have had depositor preferences in bank liquidations.
Accordingly, when the FDIC is involved in its capacity as receiver, the
National Bank Act must be read in conjunction with the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.64
In Downriver Community Federal Credit Union v. Penn Square
Bank,65 the plaintiffs, certain uninsured depositors in the insolvent Penn
Square Bank, disputed the priority of the depositors' claims against the
insolvent bank's assets. The court reversed the district court's imposition
of a constructive trust upon Penn Square's assets in favor of the plaintiff-
depositors, stating that "federal law limits these depositors' recovery to their
pro rata share of the assets held by the receiver. '66 Unsecured creditors of
a failed bank are entitled to only their pro rata share of liquidated bank
assets under the relevant provision of the National Bank Act.67
The district court imposed a constructive trust in favor of plaintiffs
because it applied state law, rather than federal law, in deciding the case.
Prior to the insolvency of a national bank, state law generally governs the
nature of the relationship between a national bank and its depositors.68
The creditor rights of a depositor of a national bank are determined by the
law of the state of the deposit, assuming there is no conflicting federal
Section 194 provides in part that "the comptroller shall make a ratable dividend
of the money so paid over to him by the receiver on all such claims as may have
been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion." These statutory provisions were originally enacted in 1866 as part of the
NBA. Early decisions construing these laws arose in the context of bank
liquidations and characterized the purpose of the requirements as ensuring
equality of treatment among creditors in the distribution of assets of a failed
bank.
Id.; see, e.g., White v. Knox, 111 U.S. 784. 786 (1884); National Bank v. Colby, 88 U.S.
609, 613 (1874).
63. See, e.g., Downriver, 879 F.2d at 754 (holding that federal law limits a depositor's
recovery, in a bank liquidation, to a pro rata share of the assets held by the receiver).
64. FDIC v. McKnight, 769 F.2d 658, 662 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,475 U.S. 1010
(1986).
65. Downriver, 879 F.2d. at 756 (including the FDIC, in its capacity as receiver of Penn
Square Bank, in this dispute).
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 194 (1993)).
68. See Reno Nat'l Bank v. Seabom, 99 F.2d 482, 483 (9th Cir. 1938).
1130 Vol. 19
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss3/10
Ratway
statute. 9 However, the role that state law plays in determining the rights
of national banks is limited by the paramount authority of Congress to
regulate national banks."°
Since national banks are instrumentalities of the federal government,
it is federal law that ultimately determines the liquidation preferences of
unsecured creditors in a bank failure. In fact, any attempt by a state to
define or control the liquidation process of national banks and any other
FDIC insured banks is absolutely void.7" In addition, national banks are
under federal control in a bank liquidation and the liquidation of all other
FDIC insured banks is governed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, with
liquidation preferences specifically provided for by the depositor preference
provision."
Before the National Depositor Preference provision was enacted, the
distribution of an insolvent bank's assets was controlled, in the case of
national banks, by the National Bank Act.73 The most relevant provisions
of the Act were section 91, precluding payments by a bank that prefer some
creditors over others, and section 194, requiring a pro rata distribution of
assets among all general creditors entitled to share in the receivership
estate.74 All state laws inconsistent with the equal distribution scheme
among general creditors, established by the National Bank Act, were
preempted."
The National Bank Act was created to achieve, in case of a bank failure,
"a just and equal distribution of the assets of national banks among all
unsecured creditors . , "This public aim in favor of all the citizens
of every State of the Union is manifested by the entire context of the
national bank act." '77 There must be a ratable distribution of an insolvent
bank's assets among all unsecured creditors, not a preference of some
69. Downriver, 879 F.2d at 758.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
73. Downriver, 879 F.2d at 759.
74. Id.
75. Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216, 226 (1935).
76. Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 284 (1896); see also United States v.
Lemaire, 826 F.2d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 1987).
77. Davis, 161 U.S. at 284.
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creditors over others.78 The FDIC, therefore, in its capacity as receiver for
the insolvent bank, must treat all unsecured creditors equitably.79
Clearly, since the creation of the National Bank Act in 1864, the intent
of Congress has been to provide equal treatment to all unsecured creditors
in a bank liquidation."0 However, with the ever increasing number of bank
failures in the 1980s and early 1990s,"' the FDIC realized that treating all
unsecured creditors of a failed bank equally was becoming an increasingly
difficult endeavor. This is especially true now since most bank failures
today no longer result in liquidation, as they did when the National Bank
Act was first enacted.
82
Most recent bank failures are resolved through purchase and assumption
agreements, rather than through the liquidation and distribution of the bank's
assets contemplated by the National Bank Act.83 A purchase and assump-
78. Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. FDIC, 733 F.2d 1403, 1407 (10th Cir. 1984).
79.
Unlike the FDIC, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
("FSLIC") was never subject to the ratable distribution requirements of the NBA
[National Bank Act]. The FSLIC could, and indeed was obligated to,
discriminate among creditors in distributing receivership assets by following the
depositor preference statute set forth in federal regulations. FIRREA simply
codified this result [§ 1821(i)(2)] with respect to thrifts, and did no more than
preserve the status quo.
Senior Unsecured Creditors'Comm., 749 F. Supp. at 774 n.24.
80. See Mcorp, 755 F. Supp. at 1407.
81. Banking Failures:
YEAR NUMBER DEPOSITS (Billions)
1945-54 44
1955-64 47
1965-74 60
1975-81 75
1982 42 9.9
1983 48 5.4
1984 79 2.9
1985 120 8.1
1986 138 6.5
1987 184 6.3
1988 200 24.9
1989 206 24.1
1990 169 14.8
1991 127 53.8
1992 122 N.A.
GART, supra note 1, at 148.
82. Senior Unsecured Creditors'Comm., 749 F. Supp. at 775.
83. Id.
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tion agreement involves a solvent bank acquiring an insolvent bank. When
a solvent acquiring bank assumes the assets and liabilities of a failed bank,
with financial assistance from the FDIC, some, but not all of the failed
bank's liabilities are assumed." Consequently, the assumed creditors
receive more on their claims than the unassumed creditors, thereby creating
an unequal distribution of a failed bank's assets to creditors.85 Thus, the
courts were left to determine "whether the assumption and full payment of
certain liabilities by an acquiring bank violates the rights vested by
[sections] 91 and 194 in creditors whose liabilities are not assumed. 86
Most courts held that the FDIC was required to provide creditors of a
failed bank with a ratable share of the banks assets, regardless of whether
the bank failure is resolved through a purchase and assumption transaction
or a liquidation. However, some courts did recognize "considerable
force" in the FDIC's argument that purchase and assumption transactions
were not contemplated under the National Bank Act, and therefore, the
distribution requirements of sections 91 and 194 should be different for
these transactions.88 The FDIC argued that only the ratable distribution of
the liquidated value of the unassumed creditor's claim should be required
under sections 91 and 194.89 With the creation of the National Depositor
Preference provision, determining the applicability of sections 91 and 194
to purchase and assumption transactions became moot.
In 198690 and 1988, 9' the FDIC had bills introduced in the Senate
that would have created preference payments to depositors only for national
bank failures, but Congress did not pass either bill.92 The bills were
proposed because of the strain placed on the FDIC by the troubled banking
industry. In the absence of a depositor preference provision, general
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 775.
87. See, e.g., FDIC v. United States Nat'l Bank, 685 F.2d 270, 273-77 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a defrauded, subordinated note holder was entitled to receive a ratable
distribution from assets transferred in a purchase and assumption transaction); First Empire
Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1371 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that a purchase and assumption
agreement which provided 100% payment to assumed creditors but lesser payment to
unassumed creditors violated the provisions of sections 91 and 194).
88. Senior Unsecured Creditors'Comm., 749 F. Supp. at 775-76.
89. Id. at 776.
90. S. 2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1986).
91. S. 2715, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1988).
92. Mcorp, 755 F. Supp. at 1419 n.36.
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creditors normally receive full payment of their claims since the majority of
bank failures are resolved by purchase and assumption agreements. 93
With the large number of bank failures that the FDIC handled, paying
everyone in full, rather than simply a pro rata share, became a burden that
the bank insurance fund was unable to bear. From 1986 through 1993, the
FDIC, through the deposit insurance fund, paid out approximately $31.93
billion for the resolution of failed banks. 94 It appears that during this same
period, if depositor preference had been in effect, the deposit insurance fund
would have actually grown because the assets of the failed banks, in most
instances, would have been adequate to cover the deposit liabilities of the
failed banks.95
The natural step for the FDIC to take, since Congress created the
agency for the protection of depositors and the integrity of the banking
system, was to prefer depositors in the distribution of a bank's assets, thus
granting much needed relief for the bank insurance fund. However, the
FDIC's inclination to give preference to depositors, in an attempt to protect
the deposit insurance fund against loss, is contrary to the congressional
intent of equitable and ratable payment of all general creditors.9 6  It
became apparent to both Congress and the FDIC that something needed to
change in order to relieve the burden placed on the deposit insurance fund
while at the same time insuring the integrity of the banking system.
93. Id. at 1419.
94. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT To CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,
1992 BANK RESOLUTIONS-FDIC CHOSE METHODS DETERMINED LEAST COSTLY, BUTNEEDS
To IMPROVE PROCESS 2 (May 10, 1994).
95. Bank Failures:
YEAR NUMBER TOTAL ASSETS (Billions)
1986 145 7.63
1987 203 9.23
1988 221 52.62
1989 207 29.40
1990 169 15.74
1991 127 63.40
1992 122 44.23
1993 42 4.06
Id. at 10.
96. First Empire Bank, 572 F.2d at 1371.
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IV. WHAT IS DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE?
The solution chosen by Congress on August 10, 1993 was a national
depositor preference scheme, which took effect on August 13, 1993. 9'
[A]mounts realized from the liquidation or other resolution of any
insured depository institution by any receiver.., shall be distributed to
pay claims (other than secured claims .. .) in the following order of
priority:
(i) Administrative expenses of the receiver.
(ii) Any deposit liability of the institution.
(iii) Any other general or senior liability of the institution ......
Depositor preference was included in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act
of 1993 "as a replacement for the administration's [unpopular] proposal to
raise additional [federal] revenues by charging state-chartered banks for
97. Banking, Depositor Preference Provisions May Have Impact on Foreign Creditors,
DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTIvEs, Sept. 10, 1993, at 174.
98. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)( 1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
(11) Depositor preference
(A) In general
Subject to section 1815(e)(2)(C) of this title, amounts realized from the
liquidation or other resolution of any insured depository institution by any
receiver appointed for such institution shall be distributed to pay claims (other
than secured claims to the extent of any such security) in the following order of
priority:
(i) Administrative expenses of the receiver.
(ii) Any deposit liability of the institution.
(iii) Any other general or senior liability of the institution (which is not a
liability described in clause (iv) or (v)).
(iv) Any obligation subordinated to depositors or general creditors (which is
not an obligation described in clause (v)).
(v) Any obligation to shareholders or members arising as a result of their status
as shareholders or members (including any depository institution holding
company or any shareholder or creditor of such company).
(B) Effect on State law
(i) In general
The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not supersede the law of any State
except to the extent such law is inconsistent with the provisions of such
subparagraph, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
Id. § 1821(d)(1 l)(A)-(B)(i).
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examinations conducted by the FDIC." 99 The Conference of State Banking
Supervisors ("Banking Supervisors") proposed depositor preference as an
alternative to increased examination fees which would have caused fees for
state-chartered banks to increase by one billion dollars over a four year peri-
od.' O The Banking Supervisors estimate that a national depositor prefer-
ence scheme "could save $300 million in the first year, and $1.6 billion over
five years . . ,,"0' This surpasses the Clinton administration's goal of
raising $1.37 billion over five years, through increased fees, beginning in
1994. '02 By choosing a national depositor preference scheme instead of
increasing examination fees, Congress accomplished its intended goal of
decreasing the losses to the Bank Insurance Fund and increasing revenues.
Moreover, it accomplished these goals without placing the burden on already
troubled state-chartered banks. "[T]he exam fee proposal could have cost
over $2 billion in potential loans [in the first year] ... because every dollar
in capital can support $10 in new loans."'0 3
Depositor preference amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and
gives domestic depositors a liquidation preference over all other claims,
except secured claims and administrative expenses of receivers.0 4
Consequently, in most cases, the FDIC will be fully reimbursed for its
payout to depositors, and unsecured creditors of the bank will receive little
or no money. Prior to the enactment of this bill, the FDIC paid depositors
on a pro rata basis with all other unsecured creditors.0 5 Since depositor
preference gives both insured and uninsured depositors an advantage in a
bank liquidation, the FDIC will realize tremendous savings because it is
subrogated to the claims of the depositors it has indemnified.0 6  The
FDIC will be able to recoup most of the money it pays out to depositors
before the first unsecured creditor receives anything. It is estimated that
giving depositors preference will save the insurance fund approximately $.9
99. Banking, Depositor Preference Provision May Pose Some Greater Risks, Banking
Experts Warn, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 21, 1993, at 181 [hereinafter Banking,
Depositor Preference].
100. Bill Atkinson, States Push Alternatives to Hitting Their Banks with Higher Fees,
AMERICAN BANKER, Mar. 30, 1993, at 7.
101. Id.
102. Banks Hope Fed Heard Cue When House Rejected Exam Fees, 5 THOMSON'S
INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATOR, May 17, 1993, at 3.
103. Senate Committees Approve Banking Plan for Reconciliation, Delay Direct
Lending, BNA WASH. INSIDER, June 10, 1993, at 105.
104. H.R. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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billion over the 1994-1998107 period.'08  However, the increased risk to
unsecured creditors will have a profoundly negative effect on both the
banking industry and unsecured creditors.
Depositor preference applies to both insured and uninsured depositors
and shifts the burden of paying off depositors from the FDIC to the failed
bank. By shifting the risks associated with a bank's investments to the
banks themselves rather than to the FDIC, the moral hazard associated with
depositor insurance is virtually eliminated. This will cause banks to more
carefully choose and monitor investments, thereby reducing the risks that
lead to failure.
Historically, all creditors of a failed bank were generally able to
recover seventy percent to eighty-five percent of the debts owed to them by
the bank. 9 All creditors, other than secured creditors, shared equally in
any loss when the bank's liquidated assets were insufficient to pay its liabili-
ties." O  Depositor preference has changed this equality, giving both
depositors and the FDIC an advantage over all other unsecured creditors of
a failed bank.
V. EFFECT OF DEPOSITOR PREFERENCE ON
UNSECURED CREDITORS
Prior to the enactment of the depositor preference statute, senior
obligations, such as letters of credit,"' were treated the same as uninsured
deposits in a bank liquidation. Now, unsecured creditors of a bank, in order
to protect themselves from risk, will be forced to either tum to other
financial institutions for investment and business transactions, or will assume
the risk of dealing with a bank only on a collateralized basis." 2 Since
there may only be enough assets to satisfy the claims of secured creditors
and depositors, unsecured creditors risk losing everything if a bank fails.
107. See id.
108. Senate Banking Committee Approves House Budget Reconciliation Package, 60
BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS BANKING REP., June 14, 1993, § 24, at 872.
109. John L. Douglas, Depositor Preference May Harm Banks, THE NAT'L L.J., Aug.
23, 1993, at 19.
110. Id.
111. A letter of credit is a "credit instrument issued by a bank guaranteeing payments
on behalf of its customer to a BENEFICIARY, normally to a third party... for a stated
period of time and when certain conditions are met." DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMs 34
(2d ed. 1993).
112. Ely, supra note 12, at 24.
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Thus, depositor preference exposes unsecured creditors to risk that may be
too great to bear.
For example, if a bank has liabilities totaling ten dollars and assets of
nine dollars, the bank is insolvent and is considered a failed bank. If nine
dollars of the bank's liabilities are deposits, depositors will receive nine
dollars, while other unsecured creditors receive nothing. Before the creation
of national depositor preference, the failed bank's assets would have been
distributed on a pro rata basis. A pro rata distribution of the failed bank's
assets would have resulted in all unsecured creditors receiving ninety cents
on the dollar. The FDIC would have received eight dollars and ten cents,
after paying out nine dollars to insured depositors (assuming all the
depositors of the bank were insured), and the other unsecured creditors of
the failed bank would have received ninety cents.
Adding uninsured depositors and secured creditors to the equation,
under a pro rata distribution scheme, simply decreases the amount recovered
by the FDIC and unsecured creditors. However, under the current depositor
preference scheme, this virtually guarantees that there will be nothing left
for unsecured creditors when a bank failure is resolved. Unsecured creditors
have no choice but to react defensively to the new threat posed by depositor
preference.
"Unsecured bank borrowings, such as uninsured bank notes, may begin
to include 'acceleration clauses' that will [enable] the [creditor to] pull its
money out of the bank before [the institution enters receivership].""' 3
Additionally, foreign depositors and unsecured creditors can: 1) "require
collateral, to the extent legally allowed, to secure their extensions of credit;
[2] shorten the maturity of their deposits or obligations[;] or [3] insert put
options" 4 that can be exercised when a bank's credit rating is downgraded
by a rating agency....
The negative impact that the depositor preference provision will have
on unsecured creditors of banks will greatly affect the banking industry.
Unsecured creditors of a bank will be wiped out before the FDIC and
113. Id. at 25.
114. A put option is:
[a) contract giving the holder the right, but not the obligation, to sell a security
or financial instrument for a specified period of time at a specific price, called
the EXERCISE PRICE OR STRIKE PRICE. Puts are bought by investors who believe
the price of the underlying securities will go down, and they will be able to sell
the securities as a higher striking price. The opposite is a CALL OPTION.
DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 487 (2d ed.o1993) (emphasis omitted).
115. Banking, Depositor Preference, supra note 99, at 181.
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uninsured domestic depositors suffer any loss. 116 The most likely unse-
cured creditors of a bank are holders of banker's acceptances," 7 federal
funds"' sellers, unsecured lenders, landlords, and counterparties in
swaps,1 9 options,12  and futures"' transactions. 22  In addition, banks
are commercial enterprises that "acquire products, contract for services and
deal with other financial institutions and their customers.' 23  Commercial
relationships cause a bank to "contract for various services and lease...
equipment ... assume a number of contractual liabilities to employees..
[and] enter into long-term contracts to perform certain services...., 24
All of these unsecured creditors face the increased risk placed upon them by
the depositor preference scheme.
Foreign depositors are at great risk under depositor preference because
the "FDIC [has] take[n] the position that foreign deposits payable only in
overseas branches are not deposits for purposes of the depositor preference
provisions., 125  Foreign depositors that fall into this category are lumped
together with unsecured creditors and stand to lose all of their money when
a bank fails, and its assets are liquidated. For this reason, foreign depositors
must take the same precautions as other unsecured creditors of a bank.
116. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
117. A banker's acceptance is a "time draft drawn on and accepted by a bank .... With
the credit strength of a bank behind it, the banker's acceptance usually qualifies as a MONEY
MARKET instrument. The liability assumed by the bank is called its acceptance liability."
DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMs 3 (3d ed. 1991).
118. Federal funds are "funds deposited by commercial banks at Federal Reserve Banks
.... Banks may lend federal funds to each other on an overnight basis... [and] may also
transfer funds among themselves or on behalf of customers on a same-day basis by debiting
and crediting balances in the various reserve banks." Id. at 139-40.
119. A swap is the "exchange [of] one security for another." Id. at 451.
120. An option is a "right to buy or sell property that is granted in exchange for an
agreed-upon sum. If the right is not exercised after a specified period, the option expires and
the option buyer forfeits the money." Id. at 297.
121. Futures contracts are contracts involving an:
agreement to buy or sell a specific amount of a commodity or financial
instrument at a particular price on a stipulated future date. The price is
established between buyer and seller on the floor of a commodity exchange..
. [T]he contract [may be] sold to another before settlement date, which may
happen if a trader [wants] to take a profit or cut a loss.
Id. at 168.
122. Ely, supra note 12.
123. Douglas, supra note 109, at 23.
124. Id.
125. Banking, Depositor PreferenceProvisions May Have Impact on Foreign Creditors,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 10, 1993, at 174.
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The larger, "too big to fail" banks are now much more attractive to
both foreign depositors and general creditors. Consequently, there may be
a shift of funds away from smaller banks. This potential shift in assets may
cause an increased number of smaller banks to fail over the next several
years, causing an adverse effect on small business, since smaller banks tend
to cater to individual and small business financing. The potential repercus-
sions of the depositor preference provision were ignored by Congress when
it enacted the new budget bill.
Depositor preference will force foreign depositors, federal funds sellers,
and other creditors to extend credit to a bank only if they can protect
themselves from the risk of loss associated with a bank failure. 2 6 They
can demand that any credit extended be fully secured, thus placing them
ahead of depositors in a liquidation, or they could include acceleration
clauses 127 in all of their loan documents. 121 If acceleration clauses are
widely used, as soon as there is even a rumor that a bank is in trouble,
unsecured creditors will demand and receive the balance of any outstanding
debt owed to them by the bank. Consequently, depositors may follow the
lead of the more informed unsecured creditors, possibly resulting in a run
on the bank and another bank failure.
VI. EFFECT ON THE BANKING INDUSTRY
The public's interest lies in secure deposits. 29 Having banks FDIC
insured and regulated is perceived as a key element of maintaining deposit
security. The introduction of the National Depositor Preference statute virt-
ually guaranteed depositors that all of their deposits would be returned in
case of a bank failure. The tradeoff for depositor security, however, is the
increased risk of all other unsecured creditors of insured banks. 30
The long-term repercussions of depositor preference on the banking
industry are still unclear. "Because the [depositor preference] provision was
126. Banking, Depositor Preference, supra note 99, at 181.
127. An acceleration clause is a "provision, normally present in an INDENTURE
agreement, mortgage, or other contract, that the unpaid balance is to become due and payable
if specified events of default should occur. Such events include failure to meet interest,
principle, or sinking fund payments; insolvency ...... DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 2-3 (3d ed. 1991).
128. Ely, supra note 12, at 24.
129. Deangelis, supra note 57, at 777.
130. "The term 'insured bank' means any bank (including a foreign bank having an
insured branch) the deposits of which are insured in accordance with the provisions of this
Act .... 12 U.S.C. § 1813(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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a small amendment in a very large and complex non-banking act, it received
... little ...attention" from either Congress or the general public.'
Unsecured creditors will take protective actions, as discussed in part five, as
a result of their increased risk. These protective measures will affect the
risk position of the FDIC as insurer. The FDIC could possibly respond by:
redesign[ing] its calculation of deposit insurance premiums, to take
[into] account ... the amount of senior and junior claims as newly
defined [under the depositor preference provision]; redesign[ing] its
calculation of capital and capital requirements, for the same reasons;
interven[ing] or clos[ing] banks more quickly, because of the greater
likelihood of runs [on banks by federal funds] sellers or foreign deposi-
tor[s]; or ... [delaying the closing of banks] because of the greater
degree of insolvency necessary to inflict a loss on the insurance
fund. 32
Additionally, banks will seek to restructure their contractual arrange-
ments and organizations in order to reduce deposit insurance premiums that
are greater than the risk to the insurance fund. 33 An individual bank, for
example, could decrease the amount of federal funds and foreign deposits,
thereby balancing the risk posed to the insurance fund and the insurance
premiums charged by the FDIC. However, uninsured depositors may react
to this restructuring by shifting their deposits to banks that have a greater
proportion of foreign deposits and federal funds, since these banks are
perceived as being safer for uninsured depositors in case of a failure.'34
Specifically, when a bank fails, uninsured depositors will be made whole
before any unsecured creditors. Therefore, it is beneficial for uninsured
depositors to bank where there is a large proportion of unsecured creditors.
If uninsured creditors, banks, and the FDIC take reactive measures other, as
yet undetermined, consequences may occur. 35
VII. CONCLUSION
The National Depositor Preference provision of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 was intended, by the Committee on the Budget,
to be one part of an intricate plan to reduce the federal deficit and to raise
131. Banking, Depositor Preference, supra note 99, at 181.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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revenues."' Additionally, depositor preference was intended to save the
insurance fund and taxpayers a great deal of money. "Only when all
depositors have recovered 100 percent of losses [will] general creditors
recover anything. Thus, we expect that receipts to the federal deposit
insurance funds from asset sales [will] be higher, and insurance losses [will]
be lower""' than under previous laws that divided the assets of a failed
bank on a pro rata basis.
Since the enactment of the depositor preference statute, on August 10,
1993, the banking industry is healthier than it has been in thirteen years.' 38
"[J]ust [thirteen] BIF-insured institutions, with $1.6 billion in assets, failed
[in 1994]."'"9 In comparison, twenty-three banks were closed in the first
half of 1993.140 Further, the bank insurance fund is up to $19.4 billion,
which is an all-time record. 14 ' Banks were earning record-high profits in
1994, with the number of problem banks "down to 383 with $53 billion in
assets, compared with 981 with $535 billion in assets two years ago.' 42
The banking industry is realizing an economic boom. One of the
consequences of this, however, is that the depositor preference provision has
had no impact on banks, the FDIC, or unsecured creditors. Because it has
received very little attention, the negative impact that this provision will
have on all parties concerned, once the rate of bank failures increases, will
be immediate and dangerous. Unsecured creditors will shift to the larger
"too big to fail" banks to insure the security of their money, and uninsured
depositors will seek banks that have a proportionally large number of
unsecured creditors to better guarantee a one hundred percent return on their
deposits in case of a bank failure. This shift may create instability in the
banking industry and cause even more banks to fail. Clearly, in an attempt
to raise revenues in the short term, Congress has ignored the potentially
devastating consequences of the depositor preference provisions.
David J. Ratway
136. H.R. REP. No. I11, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1993).
137. Id.
138. Banking, L.A. TIMES. Aug. 10, 1994, at D2.
139. The $4 Billion Solution, ABA BANKING JOURNAL, Feb. 1995, at 17.
140. Banking, supra note 138, at D2.
141. See The $4 Billion Solution, supra note 139, at 17.
142. Bank Profits Soar; Thrifts'Slip a Bit; Losses at Three Big S&Ls Hurt First-Quarter
Earnings for the Nation's Thrifts. Commercial Banks Healthy, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 16,
1994, at C1.
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